This study aims to examine the stability of inefficient Nash equilibria and analyze asymmetries in managerial behavioral transitions among firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Using financial data from 109 firms over the period 2014–2023, managerial behavior was assessed through discretionary accruals as an indicator for distinguishing between honest and opportunistic behavior, along with stock price crash risk. Discretionary accruals were estimated using the Modified Jones model, and the dynamics of behavioral transitions were analyzed through a Markov chain model. In addition, independent sample t-tests and comparative analyses were employed to examine differences among behavioral groups. The results indicate that, over the entire study period, the frequency of states associated with honest managers exceeded that of opportunistic managers. However, among the four defined behavioral states, the inefficient Nash equilibrium exhibited the highest level of persistence and, in some years—particularly between 2017 and 2019—experienced complete stability. The findings also reveal that, in most years, there is no statistically significant difference between firms in the inefficient Nash equilibrium and other firms in terms of the mean level of discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the results of the supplementary test based on survival analysis indicate that exiting the inefficient Nash equilibrium is time consuming and costly, suggesting a high degree of persistence in this state.